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encies of reinforcement. Scientific discovery is Lacey and Schwartz’s paradigmatic 
case of such behavior. As an example of a scientific discovery they cite Skinner’s 
own invention of the Skinner box. This was perhaps an unfortunate choice since, 
in the second volume of his autobiography {The Shaping of a Behaviorist), 
Skinner makes a point of showing how this particular invention arose by degrees 
from earlier reinforced behavior. It is no more difficult, in principle, to make such 
interpretations than it is to explain the fall of a leaf in terms of gravity and 
aerodynamics. Whether a particular effort at interpretation is worthwhile is 
another question.
It would seem, from the success of current applications of behaviorism to 
everyday life, especially to situations involving self-control, that interpretation in 
open settings is worthwhile and that human life, in all its richness, may be more 
regular than Lacey and Schwartz suspect.
Let us now turn briefly to the supposed superiority of the mentalistic vocabul­
ary as applied to open settings. Lacey and Schwartz claim that the richness of the 
teleological (i.e., mental) explanation ‘depends on its capacity to display a wide 
variety, pattern and sequence of actions as leading to the same goal.’ If this is a 
statement about psychology (as opposed to physics or biology), it needs to be 
accompanied by a method to ascertain why a person believes certain actions to be 
appropriate to a given goal. Otherwise, what stops a person from believing any 
action is appropriate to any goal? No such method is provided by Lacey and 
Schwartz or, indeed, by any mentalist. Lacey and Schwartz believe that people 
may act in accordance with what they are told or contrary to what they are told, 
in accordance with a set of logical principles or contrary to a set of logical 
principles, in accordance with their nature or contrary to their nature, in accord­
ance with what is good for them or contrary to what is good for them, etc. At 
what point does an explanation become too rich? Lacey and Schwartz reject the 
notion that belief is governed by any set of potential rules, no matter how 
complex. For them it is impossible to understand how people acquire their beliefs, 
it is impossible to know for sure what their beliefs are, hence it is impossible for 
Lacey and Schwartz to understand why people behave as they do.
LACEY AND SCHWARTZ REPLY TO RACHLIN
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF APPLICABILITY
Rachlin identifies practical application, the achievement of control, as the pre­
eminent criterion for assessing the explanatory power of a theory. In this he is 
consistent with arguments made many times over the years by Skinner. In our 
response we will focus on this one point. But let us first be clear on where we do 
not take issue with Rachlin. First, we agree with Rachlin that radical behaviorist 
theories have generated significant practical applications, arguably more so than 
the alternatives he discusses. Second, an acceptable theory must generate practic­
al applications. However, the necessity here is neither logical nor methodological, 
but social. Practical applications are a requirement for the social support that 
makes rapid theory development possible. Third, ‘mentalism’, as characterized by
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Rachlin, is indeed trivial. It is not a serious alternative to radical behaviorism.
With these areas of agreement clear, let us turn to the significance of practi­
cal application for validating theories. The view that the power generated by a 
theory, manifested by the extent to which it allows us to control things, is a 
reflection of the explanatory power of a theory is deeply rooted in contemporary 
scientific culture. The argument for it is apparently simple and compelling. Power 
results from having discovered the laws of nature, or of a relevant domain of 
nature, such as behavior. When we exercise control, we are merely bringing about 
the boundary conditions within which those laws are known to be operative in the 
given domain. Conversely, if there are some putative explanatory principles that 
do not allow us to achieve control, it must be because these principles do not 
actually represent laws of the domain. So application, through control, allows us 
to separate the wheat from the chaff; to distinguish the actual laws of nature from
the pretenders. • r. u ■
We will evaluate this argument only with respect to the domain of behavior, 
though our remarks could be extended to other domains. Clearly, there is some­
thing right about the argument. Its weakness lies in the diffieulty and ambiguity of 
specifying the ‘relevant domain’ over which the explanatory scheme is meant to 
operate. The possibility of implementing behavioral controls is a consequence of 
having discovered the regularities (laws) of some domain. The question is: which 
domain? We have argued that the controls (successful applications) enpndered 
by radical behaviorism have occurred only in what we called closed settinp . On 
this argument the regularities expressed in radical behaviorist theories are just the 
laws of behavior in closed settings. We have further argued that, from the 
perspective of teleological explanation (which is not ‘mentalist’ as Rachlin defines 
the term), behavioral regularities of the sort described by behaviorists only occur 
in closed settings. So the laws are laws that operate in the domain of closed 
settings, and the applications are applications that work in the domain of closed 
settings. That the domain of operation of laws and the domain of successful 
application line up is hardly a defect of the theory in itself.
However, what our argument makes clear is that the mere fact of successful 
control itself tells us nothing about the extent of the explanatory power of the 
principles that underlie this power to control. That the principles enable control 
of behavior in closed settings implies nothing about whether or not they are 
salient principles for explaining behavior in general. Whether they do the job in 
open settings is an empirical question. If they do not, their explanatory scope will 
depend upon the relative frequency of closed and of open settings in the environ­
ments in which people typically find themselves — another empirical issue.
We are not making a skeptical point here, or attempting to forestall on 
ordinary, inductive move from simple to complex cases. We have argued from the 
perspective of teleology, a scheme that not only offers concrete explanations 
where behaviorism offers only gestures, but also serves to define the limits of 
applicability of behaviorist principles, portraying behavior that is under the con­
trol of those principles as a degenerate case of purposive behavior. It is true that a 
teleological scheme has the conceptual resources to explain every action, but that 
is not the vice that Rachlin suggests, since it does not offer the sort of trivial 
‘explanations’ that Rachlin’s mentalistic straw person does. Moreover, it makes a 
difference — a practical, everyday differenee. Accepting teleology in broad out­
line implies interacting with other human beings differently from the way implied
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by the behaviorist outline; emphasizing relations of dialogue rather than control.
Rachlin seems to offer two responses to this argument. First, he suggests that 
there are clear instances of the application of operant principles in open settings, 
for example, procedures of ‘self-control’ and the treatment of pain. Elsewhere 
(Schwartz, 1984, Ch. 7; Schwartz and Lacey, 1982, Ch. 8), we argued that a 
number of applied behavioral procedures like those of ‘self-control’ could not 
properly be regarded as exemplifications of operant principles; that they make 
sense only in terms of teleological categories. Lacey (1985) made a similar argu­
ment concerning Rachlin’s (1985) behavioral analysis of pain and its treatment. 
We note, however, that arguments of this type are of the required kind, if they 
are successful, to undermine our conclusion.
The second response is to suggest that mentalistic terms, presumably includ­
ing teleological ones, can be translated into behaviorist terms, though the transla­
tions may be rather complex and cumbersome. Our argument suggests that such 
‘translations’ are impossible, at least if they are to have any explanatory role, 
since we have used the teleological scheme in part to identify the limits of 
behaviorist explanation. Over and above this general, and admittedly arguable, 
point we can only deal with such translations as are explicitly and specifically 
offered. Rachlin offers none.
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